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THE PROPER ROLE OF THE ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES
Eric D. Chason·
Robert T. Danforth••

Editors' Synopsis: The authors argue that the goals of estate and gift
taxation are not served by taxing closely held businesses when the
recipient ofthe business actively participates in its operation. Further,
the authors suggest that taxing closely held businesses tends to harm
capital production. The authors propose an approach to estate and
gift taxation that encourages productive behavior by the recipients of
wealth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government imposes estate 1 and giff taxes3 on gratuitous
transfers made at death and during life by relatively wealthy people. 4 The

1

I.R.C. §§ 2001-22078 (1994) .
I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1994).
3
For convenience, we refer to the estate tax and the gift tax collectively as "the
estate and gift tax" even though transfer taxation comprises separate taxes. Although the
generation-skipping transfer tax is part of this system, this tax is not central to our thesis.
4
Edward J . McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Weallh Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE
L.J. 283, 299 (1994) (referring to "the very wealthy families who are the only ones
paying" estate taxes). I.R.C. § 2001, which sets out the rate schedule for estate and gift
taxation, imposes a tax of $192,800 on estates and "adjusted lifetime gifts" that total
$600,000 in value. This tax, however, is precisely offset by the "unified credit" of I.R.C.
§ 2010(a). Moreover, I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 provide an unlimited deduction for most
interspousal transfers. Thus, a spouse with $1,200,000 may give $600,000 to the other
spouse. Both may then avail themselves of their individual unified credits, leaving neither
with any transfer tax liability. Hence, a de facto minimum taxable estate size for married
couples is at least $1,200,000, but competent planning allows the tax-free transfer of even
more wealth by a married couple. Cf. John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer
Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 539, 546-48 (1993) (discussing other, more sophisticated planning techniques);
George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated &tate Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 passim (1977) (describing federal transfer taxes as
"voluntary").
2
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rate of taxation on these transfers is high, 5 and, without proper estate
planning, the taxes can claim a large portion of any taxable transfer. The
transfer taxes are particularly burdensome, however, for the recipients of
interests in closely held businesses. These interests are often difficult to
value,6 and their owners may face liquidity problems because a ready
market for interests in closely held businesses does not exist. 7 Congress has
partially responded to the concerns of owners of closely held businesses
with special provisions in the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter I.R.C . or
Code]. These provisions deal with some unusual valuation situations, 8 allow
for installment payments of the estate tax, 9 and permit sale or exchange
treatment for certain redemptions of stock10 following a decedent's death. 11
Members of Congress have proposed even more lenient treatment of
closely held businesses under the estate tax 12 because of its perceived
harshness and its potential to force the liquidation of businesses. 13 Leniency
may be improvident, however, if the only problems facing closely held
businesses under the estate tax are steep rates and illiquidity. The rates
under I.R.C. § 2001 are no higher for closely held enterprises than they are
for any other form of wealth, and the deferral allowances of the Code 14
should solve true liquidity problems.

5

Compare I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1994) (imposing a maximum marginal rate of 55% on
the taxable estate) with I.R.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (imposing a maximum marginal
rate of39.6% on income).
6
See Zinichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Srock in Closely Held
Corporations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65, 65 (1993); see also infra Part IJ.E (discussing
valuation difficulties facing closely held businesses).
7
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273-77 (1986).
8
See I.R.C. § 2032A (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0 .1. (discussing § 2032A).
9
See l.R.C. § 6166 (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0.2. (discussing§ 6166).
10
A redemption occurs when a corporation buys its own stock from a shareholder.
The issue is whether the Code deems the transaction to be a sale of stock or a dividend.
See infa notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
1
See l.R.C. § 303 (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0.3. (discussing§ 303).
12
Cf. 141 CoNG. REC. S14883-07, S14897 (1995) (proposing an exclusion from
estate taxation of $1 .5 million and 50% above that amount of a closely owned business
under certain circumstances); 143 CONG. REc. S163-02, S176 (1997) (proposing the
samel:.
3
See 141 CONG. REC. S14883-07, S14884 (1995) ("[M]any times these enterprises
are literally forced out of business because of the imposition of the estate tax.").
14
See infra Part 11.0.2. (discussing I.R.C. § 6166).
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Perhaps closely held businesses deserve greater leniency under the
estate and gift tax because taxing the transfer of closely held businesses does
not further the goals of wealth transfer taxation. One important goal of
taxing wealth transfers is decreasing inherited wealth, thereby encouraging
beneficiaries of these transfers to engage in productive work. 15 What if the
recipient of an interest in a closely held business intends to participate
actively in the business? If so, the recipient fulfills the goal of encouraging
productive work even if the tax is not imposed. No tax, or a diminished tax
in this situation, may be beneficial because the tax generates little revenue. 16
Moreover, the tax may deter the production of capital. 17
This Article argues that encouraging productive work by recipients of
wealth may be the only goal of the estate and gift tax that is both achievable
and economically sound. 18 Taxing the transfer of closely held businesses in
which the recipients will be active participants not only fails to further this
goal, but also detrimentally affects capital production.
Part II of this Article outlines the present system of taxing wealth
transfers and describes special provisions applicable to closely held
businesses. Part II also highlights many of the problems with the application of the present system to closely held businesses. Part III catalogues
several justifications for taxing wealth transfers.
It concludes that
encouraging productive work by recipients of wealth is the only economically sound goal, and that it is the only goal that the present system
successfully accomplishes. Part IV builds on this foundation by analyzing
the treatment of closely held businesses under the present system. It shows
that interests in closely held businesses are theoretically distinct from other
forms of wealth and that this difference justifies a reduction of transfer
taxation of these interests. Indeed, taxing them encourages the donor to

IS See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 320-21; Mark L . Ascher, Curtailing Inherited
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 99 (1990) ("Great wealth confers tremendous disincentives
to work.").
16
See Donaldson, supra note 4, at 542-43; BORIS I. BITIKER & EUAS ClARK,
FEDERALEsTATEAND GIFr TAXATION 1 (6th ed . 1990) ("The taxes that are the subject of
this book are not important sources of government revenue.").
17
MICHAELJ . BOSKJN, AN ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVEON ESTATE TAXATION 62-63,
in DEA'lll, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 56 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
18
See infra Part 111.0.
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engage in inefficient behavior, which is not offset by any gains from
encouraging the donee's efficient behavior.

ll. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
This overview highlights the basic operation of the estate and gift tax,
emphasizes the application of the tax to closely held businesses, and
demonstrates a few of the incentives for taxpayers that the tax creates. This
discussion establishes the starting point for finding the proper goal of the
estate and gift tax, a topic explored further in Part III.

A.

The Estate Tax

The estate tax provisions of the Code define the decedent's gross
estate by its value as of the decedent's death 19 or six months afterwards if
the executor so elects. 20 This value is "of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated, "21 but only "to the extent of the
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death. "22 In short, the
gross estate equals the value of the decedent's interest in property at death
or six months afterwards.
The Code imposes an estate tax, however, only upon the decedent's
taxable estate, 23 which is the decedent' s gross estate less certain
deductions. 24 The most prominent among these deductions is the marital
deduction, which allows for an unlimited deduction from the gross estate for

19

See l.R.C . § 2031(a) (1994).
See I.R.C. § 2032(a) (1994). Section 2032(c) limits the availability of this election
to situations in which the transfer tax burden will be reduced. The purpose of this limita·
tion is to prevent executors from using the election to obtain a higher income tax basis for
the decedent's property in situations in which the higher value will produce no additional
transfer taxes. See infra Part II.C.
21
See I.R.C. § 2031(a); see also§§ 2035-2038, 2041 (1994) (including in the gross
estate certain lifetime transfers).
22
See I.R.C. § 2033 (1994).
23
See I.R.C. § 200l(a) (1994). The executor of the estate is responsible for actually
payin:§ the tax. See I.R.C. § 2002 (1994).
See I.R.C. § 2051 (1994).
20
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most bequests to a swviving spouse. 25 The Code also provides an unlimited
deduction for bequests to charities26 and allows other deductions for casualty
losses, 27 as well as for various other expenses, indebtedness, and taxes. 28
I.R.C. § 2001 imposes the estate tax on the decedent's taxable
estate. 29 In most cases only those estates worth more than $600,000 have
any potential estate-tax liability because of the unified credit. 30 The Code
provides other credits for state death taxes31 and foreign death taxes. 32
Thus, the net tax liability of the estate is its gross liability under I.R.C.
§ 2001, less any applicable credits.

B.

The Gift Tax

"A tax ... on the transfer of property by gift" 33 is the subject of the
gift tax provisions of the Code. The Code imposes this tax on the donor's
taxable gifts,34 which the Code defines as total gifts less certain deductions. 35
The Code values these gifts by reference to the date of the gift. 36
The deductions from the donor's gifts mirror some of the deductions
from a decedent's gross estate. 37 Donors may deduct most charitable38 and
spousal gifts39 from their total gifts when computing taxable gifts. 40

25

See I.R.C. § 2056 (1994).
See I.R.C. § 2055 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
27
See I.R.C. § 2054 (1994).
28
See I.R.C. § 2053 (1994).
29
See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(A) (1994). I.R.C. § 2001 actually imposes the tax on the
sum of the decedent's taxable estate and the value of her "adjusted taxable gifts." See
also i.:f..a Part II.B. (discussing the gift tax).
See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1994).
31
See I.R.C. § 2001 (1994).
32
See I.R.C. § 2014 (1994).
33
See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(l) (1994).
34
See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994).
3.5
See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1994).
36
See I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1994).
37
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing, among other things, the
marital and charitable deductions).
38
See I.R.C. § 2522(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
39
See I.R.C. § 2523(a) (1994).
40
See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1994).
26
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Moreover, the Code excludes some donative transfers from the donor's gifts
for gift tax purposes. Importantly, it grants the donor a $10,000 exclusion
for gifts per donee during each calendar year, 41 and grants the donor an
unlimited exclusion for certain educational and medical expenses paid on
behalf of third parties. 42
Donors compute their gift tax liability under the estate tax schedule, 43
and the tax is cumulative. Donors may take only one trip through the
progressive rate schedule rather than beginning at the bottom of the schedule
at its lower rates each year. 44 Moreover, the gift tax liability is reduced to
the extent of the unified credit against gift taxes, 45 which allows a donor to
make up to $600,000 in lifetime gifts without incurring any gift tax
liability. 46
The combined rate schedules47 and credits for the estate tax and the
gift tax48 substantially unify the estate and gift tax regimes. Nonetheless,

41

See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (i994). For example, a person with four children may give
each of them $10,000 annually without facing any gift tax liability for the transfers.
Moreover, I.R .C. § 2513 allows a husband and wife to elect to treat all of their gifts as
made one-half by each. See I.R.C. § 2513(a)(l) (1994). Thus, under this "split gift"
rule, one spouse could transfer $20,000 annually to each donee without either spouse
facing any gift tax liability as long as the other spouse transferred nothing else to these
donees. An important limitation on these annual exclusion gifts is that they must be of a
present interest in property to qualify.
42
See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1994).
43
See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994).
44
Every year the donor first computes her liability based on the aggregate of her
lifetime taxable gifts including taxable gifts made during the current year. See I.R.C.
§ 2502(a)(l) {1994). Next, she computes her liability on the aggregate of her lifetime
taxable gifts excluding taxable gifts made during the current year. See I.R.C.
§ 2502(a)(2) (1994). The difference constitutes her gift tax liability for the current year.
See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994). This method of computation buttresses the progressive
nature of the gift tax.
45
See I.R.C. § 2505(a) (1994).
46
See supra note 4.
47
See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1994).
48
Using the gift tax credit under J.R.C. § 2505(a) effectively reduces the available
estate tax credit under I.R.C. § 2010(a). I.R.C. § 2010(a) does not, however, contain
any language to effect this reduction. See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1994). I.R.C. § 200l(b)(2)
decreases the amount of estate tax liability by the amount of gift tax "which would have
been payable" under the present schedule on lifetime gifts. The gift tax credit decreases
the amount of gift tax "which would have been payable," thus decreasing the reduction

110
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important differences between the two remain. The Code demonstrates a
preference for lifetime gifts not only by providing for the $10,000 annual
exclusion, 451 but also by utilizing different mechanics for computing the gift
tax and the estate tax. Because of these different mechanics, the gift tax
imposes a lower effective rate than does the estate tax on identical
transfers, 50 even though the nominal rates are the same. The income tax,
however, partially offsets this incentive for inter vivos giving. 51

C.

Related Income Tax Provisions

I.R.C § l02(a) flatly states that "[g]ross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. "52
Nonetheless, the recipient of such a transfer must pay income tax on the
postgift income that arises from the transferred property. 53
A recipient of property by a gratuitous transfer must have a tax basis
in the property to determine gain upon subsequent sale. This basis differs,
however, depending on whether the transfer was testamentary or inter
vivos. If testamentary, then the recipient's basis is generally the fair market
value of the property as of the decedent's death. !14 If inter vivos, however,
then the recipient's basis is generally the lesser of the pre-gift basis and the
fair market value. 55

from the estate tax liability. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (1994).
49
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
so Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History
and the Interpretation ojTax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 852 n.148 (1991). Essentially, the estate tax "taxes the tax," whereas the gift tax does not. Hence a donor may
pay the gift tax resulting from a lifetime gift without incurring additional gift tax liability.
In contrast, an estate pays estate tax even on the portion of the estate used to pay the
estate tax; this is similar to the operation of the income tax.
51
See infra Part II.C; see also infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing
the coordination between income tax basis rules for gratuitous transfers and the taxation
of the transfers).
52
I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994) .
53
See I.R.C . § 102(b) (1994). Subchapter J of the Code provides a comprehensive
scheme for the income taxation of trusts, estates, and beneficiaries thereof. See generally
I.R.C. §§ 671-92 (1994) {taxing the income of trusts and estates).
!14 See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (1994). See also I.R.C. § 1014(b) (1994) (enumerating
the testamentary transfers to which the step-up-in-basis rule applies).
55
See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1994).
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Estate and Gift Tax Provisions for Closely Held Businesses

The Code contains a handful of special provisions that apply to closely
held businesses. The most important of these are the valuation rules of
I.R.C. § 2032A, the estate tax deferral provisions of I.R.C. § 6166, and the
corporate redemption rules of I.R.C. § 303. All of these provisions,
however, have significant deficiencies that limit their effectiveness in
relieving the estate tax burden for owners of closely held businesses.
Moreover, these provisions have no application to inter vivos transfers.

1.

Section 2032A

The value of the gross estate is usually its fair market value,56 which
is generally based on the property's "highest and best use. "51 Under I.R.C.
§ 2032A, however, the executor of an estate may make a special valuation
election for "qualified real property . . . used as a farm for farming
purposes or in another trade or business. "58 The election allows the executor to value the property on the basis of its actual use rather than its highest
and best use. 59 For the estate to avail itself of this election, the deceased
owner (or a member of the owner's family) must "materially participate in
the operation of the farm or other business ... ro Because the owner of a
closely held business often materially participates in the operation of the
business, I.R.C. § 2032A has the potential to provide a substantial discount61
for the valuation of interests in closely held businesses.
The technical requirements of I. R. C. § 2032A,62 however, often limit
its usefulness to the estate of the deceased owner of a closely held business.
56

See I.R.C. §§ 2031-32 (1994).
See Michael F. Beau~ang et al., Valuation: General and Real Estate, 830 TAX
MGT. PORTFOUO at A-26 (1995).
58
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(a) (1996).
59 see id.
ro ld.
61
The maximum reduction in value available under I.R.C. § 2032A is $750,000.
See I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2) (1994).
62
I.R.C. § 2032A is one of the longest of the Internal Revenue Code estate tax
provisions, and its technical complexities are legendary. See ROBERT B. STEPHENS, ET
AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 4.04(2) (7th ed. 1997) (describing I.R.C.
§ 2032A as "a very intricate piece of legislation").
51
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To qualify under I.R.C. § 2032A, at least 25% of the value of the gross
estate must consist of real property satisfying the qualified use
requirements.63 For many closely held businesses other than farming
operations, real estate constitutes a relatively small portion of its total value.
In addition, the use value of real property in a business other than a farming
operation is likely to equal its fair market value because the property is
probably in its highest and best use. In this case, I.R.C. § 2032A provides
no valuation relief. Furthermore, even when the estate satisfies the
requirements of I.R.C. § 2032A, any valuation adjustment applies to the
real property-not to other valuable assets of the business. For these
reasons, I.R.C. § 2032A affords little practical estate tax relief for most
owners of closely held businesses, other than farms.

2.

Section 6166

The executor of an estate generally must pay taxes when the estate tax
return is due, 64 which is ·nine months after the decedenfs death. 65 Under
I.R.C. § 6166, the executor may obtain an extension of time to pay estate
taxes "[i]f the value of an interest in a closely held business . . . exceeds 35
percent of the adjusted gross estate. "66 The ratio of the value of the closely
held business to the amount of the adjusted gross estate determines the
maximum amount of estate tax to which the extension may apply.67 The
estate may begin paying the extended tax five years after it would otherwise
be due, 68 and may do so in two to ten equal, annual installments. 69 If the
maximum deferral period is selected, the final installment of estate taxes
will not be due until fourteen years~ after the ordinary date for paying estate
taxes.

63

See I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l)(B) (1994).
See I.R .C. § 6151(a) (1994).
6S
See I.R.C. § 607S(a) (1994).
66
See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(l) (1994).
67
See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(2) (1994) .
68
See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3) (1994) .
69
See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(l) (1994) .
70
The latest payment d;1te for the first installment is five years after the date prescribed by I.R.C. § 61Sl(a). See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3) (1994). The tenth installment will
occur nine years after the first. Hence, the maximum deferral period is 14 years.
64
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Unlike I.R.C. § 2032A, I.R.C. § 6166 does not reduce the estate tax
burden applicable to interests in closely held businesses. By design, I.R.C.
§ 6166 addresses liquidity concerns. The legislative history describes this
purpose as follows:
This provision is primarily designed to make it possible to keep
together a business enterprise where the death of one of the
larger owners of the business results in an imposition of a
relatively heavy estate tax. Where the decedent had a substantial portion of his estate invested in the business enterprise,
under existing law this may confront the heirs with the necessity of either breaking up the business or of selling it to some
larger business enterprise, in order to obtain funds to pay the
federal estate tax .... Therefore, although not removing any
federal estate tax in these cases, your committee hopes that by
spreading out the period over which the estate tax may be paid,
it will be possible for the estate tax in most cases to be paid for
out of the earnings of the business, or at least that it will
provide the heirs with time to obtain funds to pay the federal
estate tax without upsetting the operation of the business. Your
committee believes that this provision is particularly important
in preventing corporate mergers and in maintaining the free
enterprise system. 71
Thus, the ostensible purpose of the provision is to defer estate taxes but not
to forgive them. In many respects, I.R.C. § 6166 provides a benefit to the
estate no more valuable than a loan from a commercial lender. 72

71

H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1959-2 C.B. 709, 713
(discussing the original version of I.R.C. § 6166, enacted in 1958 as part of the
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 206). I.R.C. § 6166 was
subsequently modified. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, § 2004(a);
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 422; Tax Reform Act of
1984? Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1021.
2
In one significant respect, a commercial loan may prove more valuable to the
estate. The interest payments under I.R.C. § 6166 may be deducted for estate tax
purposes under I.R.C . § 2053 , which, in general, allows a deduction for expenses of
administration. J.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1994). Currently, however, the I.R.C. § 6166
interest obligation may be deducted for estate tax purposes only as the obligation is
incurred. See Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 548 (requiring the periodic filing of revised
estate tax returns). In the case of a commercial term loan with no pre-payment option, an

114
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In only one limited sense does I.R.C. § 6166 forgive any tax: a
preferential 4% interest rate applies to a portion of the deferred estate
taxes. 73 Under I.R.C. § 66010), a 4% interest rate applies to an amount
equal to the lesser of (1) the total estate taxes deferred or (2) the estate taxes
attributable to the first $1,000,000 of closely held business property. 74 In
most cases, the estate tax attributable to the first $1,000,000 of business
property is $153,000 ($345,800 reduced by the available unified credit).
The value of this tax benefit for a particular taxpayer depends on the
difference between the 4% interest rate and the otherwise applicable interest
rate on deferred taxes (which, under I.R.C. § 6621, is the federal shortterm rate plus 3% ).7$ Assuming an otherwise applicable interest rate of 8%,
the value of the benefit of the lower 4% rate is $38,769.36. 76 For a taxable
estate worth $3,000,<XX> or more, in which case the marginal estate tax rate
is 55%, 77 the savings correspond to a $70,489.7478 reduction in the value of
the estate for tax purposes. Thus, based on an 8% discount rate, the most
that I.R.C. § 6166 permits is tax forgiveness79 for a $70,489.74 portion of

estimate of the interest to be incurred throughout the payment period may be deducted up
front on the original estate tax return. See Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, 56
T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988). The reason for this difference in treatment is that, under
l.R.C. § 2053, an expense is deductible only if the amount of the expense "is ascertainable with reasonable certainty and will be paid. No deduction may be taken upon the
basis of a vague or uncertain estimate." Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-l(b)(3) (as amended in
1972). The position of both the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter Service] and the
United States Tax Court is that the amount of interest payable under l.R.C. § 6166 cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty until the interest is actually paid because the
taxpayer may at any time voluntarily or involuntarily prepay the deferred tax. See Estate
ofBaillyv. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 246 (1983); see also Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B.
547 ~etting forth the procedure for deducting interest as it accrues).
See l.R.C. § 6601G) (1994).
14ld.
15
See l.R.C. § 6621(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
76
This number is the net present value of a $153,000 loan bearing interest at 4%,
with the longest term to maturity under I.R.C. § 6166, assuming a discount rate of 8%.
77
See l.R.C. § 2001(a) (1994).
78
This number is $38,769.36 divided by 0.55, which is the highest marginal estate
tax rate.
79
Using the I.R.C. § 6601G) interest rate as a means of effecting estate tax relief for
closely held businesses is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, assuming that it is
appropriate to tax certain closely held businesses more favorably than other interests, see
infra Part ll.D.3., granting that favorable treatment through l.R.C. § 6166 affords
favorable treatment to certain interests that arguably should not be treated favorably and
also denies favorable treatment to interests that should be treated favorably. For exam-
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the closely held business interest. 80 Furthermore, even the modest savings
associated with the 4% interest rate are unavailable if the closely held
business interest is represented in part by stock in a holding company.81

3. Section 303
A redemption occurs when a corporation buys its stock from a
shareholder in exchange for property. 82 The tax treatment of the redemption depends upon I.R.C. § 302. The Code treats some redemptions as
sales of stock83 and other redemptions as distributions, which are usually

ple, the provisions of J.R.C. §§ 6166, 6601(j) are available whether or not the recipients
of the property are active participants in the closely held business. If a proper goal of the
transfer tax system is to increase the labor force participation of the inheritors of wealth,
see infra Part 11.0.3., then it is not proper to grant the favorable treatment of I.R.C.
§ 6601(j) to recipients of closely held businesses who do not participate in the operation
of the business. Second, the benefits of I.R.C. §§ 6166, 6601(j) will be unavailable for
certain closely held businesses that should receive favorable treatment under the estate tax
laws. For example, an estate that fails to satisfy the 35% requirement of I.R.C. § 6166
(a)(l) will receive no estate tax relief whatsoever, notwithstanding that it may make
economic sense to tax the estate favorably due to ownership of a closely held business.
Finally, the ostensible purpose of the I. R.C. § 6601(j) preferred interest rate is to relieve
the liquidity concerns of small, closely held businesses. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION , GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TilE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 547 (1976). Professor Gutman observes, however, that eligibility under I.R.C.
§ 6601(j) "is not determined by the size of the business or its cash-generating potential."
Harry L. Gutman, Refonning Federal Wealrh Transfer Taxes after ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv.
1183, 1263 (1983). The preferential interest rate thus provides a windfall to estates
without liquidity concerns. ld. at 1263-64.
80
Proposed legislation would reduce the J.R.C. § 6601(j) interest rate from 4% to
zero. See AMERICAN FAMILY TAX REUEF ACT, 143 CONG. REC. S183, 105 Cong., 1st
Sess. § 304 (granting a $153,000 interest-free loan to any estate with a $1,000,000
closelr held business interest that qualifies under I.R.C. § 6166).
8
See I.R.C. § 6166(8)(A)(iii) (1994).
82
See I.R.C. § 317(b) (1994).
83
See I.R.C. § 302(a) .(1994). The amount taxable upon a sale is the amount
realized over the adjusted basis of the property. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1997). If the stock
was a capital asset, then the gain is subject to a maximum 28% rate. See I.R.C. § l(h)
(1997).
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taxable as dividends. 84 The taxpayer usually prefers treatment as a sale or
exchange. 85
I.R.C. § 303 modifies the normal test for determining whether a
distribution made by a corporation is taxable as a sale or exchange of stock
or as ordinary income. Under I.R.C. § 303(a), a distribution of property to
a shareholder in redemption of stock that is includible in a decedenfs estate
is taxed as a sale of stock rather than as a dividend to the extent of estate,
inheritance, and other transfer taxes, as well as certain funeral and
administration expenses. 86 I.R.C. § 303 provides a mechanism for
removing cash or other property from a corporation on a tax efficient basis
if the property is needed to pay estate taxes or other expenses incurred at
death.
I.R.C. § 303(b) limits the availability of this special treatment. 81 The
most important limitation is that the value of the decedent's stock ownership
interest must exceed 35% of the excess of the value of the gross estate over
the sum of the amounts allowable to the estate for estate tax deductions
under l.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054. 88 If the decedent's estate includes stock in two
or more corporations of which 20% or more of the value of the outstanding
stock is included in the gross estate, the stock of all corporations involved is
treated as the stock of a single corporation for purposes of applying the 35%
limitation. 89
These p~rcentage limitations substantially restrict the
availability of I.R.C. § 303 treatment.

84

See I.R.C. §§ 302(d), 316 (1994). If the redemption is treated as a dividend, then
the entire amount is included in gross income and subject to a maximum 39.6% rate. See
I.R.C . § 30l(c)(1) (1994).
85
Cf. supra notes 83-84 (distinguishing between exchanges and dividends).
86
See I.R.C. § 303(a) (1994).
87
See I.R.C. § 303(b) (1994).
88
See I.R.C. § 303 (b)(2)(A) (1994). I.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(A) refers to "allowable"
deductions. Thus, for purposes ofthis limitation, the I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054 expenses need
not be actually deducted on the estate tax return. For example, expenses of administration that are deducted on the income tax return for the estate and, accordingly, are
not eligible for deduction on the estate tax return are nevertheless taken into account for
purposes of the l.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(A) limitation. See l.R.C. § 642(g} (1994 & Supp.
1996~9

See l.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(B) (1994).
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Another significant limitation is that I.R.C. § 303 treatment is
available only to the extent that the redeeming shareholder's interest in the
decedent's estate is reduced by estate, inheritance, or death taxes, or by
funeral or administration expenses. This limitation is a significant trap for
the unwary. For example, if a decedent's stock is distributed as part of a
pre-residuary disposition under the will, the pre-residuary gift will generally
bear no portion of the taxes and administration expenses, 90 and the benefits
of I.R.C. § 303 will accordingly be unavailable. Furthermore, in the
typical estate plan for a married couple, under which all estate taxes are
deferred until the death of the surviving spouse, the benefits of I.R.C. § 303
at the death of the first spouse will be minimal because the only eligible
charges to the I.R.C. § 303 property will be funeral and administration
expenses.

E.

Valuation Difficulties Facing Closely Held Businesses

Interests in closely held businesses are difficult to value. 91 The
valuation difficulties are primarily attributable to the lack of a market for
the interest (particularly if it is a minority interest) and the lack of
comparable businesses for which valuation information is readily available.
The difficulties increase when the principal of the business has died, because
the historical earnings of the business may no longer be relevant to current
value.
These valuation difficulties create numerous practical problems for
the small business owner who wishes to transfer property during life or at
death. If the owner transfers the interest during life without accurate
valuation, the owner or her successors face potential liability for gift taxes,
penalties, and interest. Even tax-free gifts that deplete the donor's unified
credit present valuation difficulties. If the donor inaccurately values the
gift, this inaccuracy continues into the donor's estimation of her remaining
unified credit and may result in the unanticipated imposition of gift taxes for

00

A typical will charges the payment of death taxes and administration expenses to
the residue of the estate. Thus , in most cases a pre-residuary disposition would not
satis~ the requisites ofi.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(B) (1994).
1
See Shishido, supra note 6, at 65 ; JOHN A. BOGDANSKI , FEDERAL TAX VALUATION
, 1.02 (1996).
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later transfers. 92 Moreover, the passage of time does not prevent the
Service from challenging this inaccuracy in the remaining unified credit.
That is, no statute of limitations prevents the Service from arguing for a
higher tax liability on current transfers due to past inaccuracies in
determining the remaining unified credit amount. 93
The inability to obtain accurate business valuations affects the owner's
estimation of estate taxes that will be due at death. If the owner wishes to
transfer the business interest at death, it may be impossible to estimate
accurately the funds that will be needed to pay the attendant estate taxes.
Until recently, buy-sell agreements could fix the value of a business for
estate tax purposes under certain circumstances. The enactment of I.R.C.
§ 2703 in 1990 significantly curtailed the usefulness of this technique for
most intra-family business transfers. 94

F.

Summary

The gift tax on inter vivos transfers allows for an annual exclusion
and imposes a lower effective rate than the estate tax imposes on testamen-

92

Suppose A has her full $600,000 unified credit amount. She makes a gift to B,
and the gift does not qualify for the annual exclusion. On her gift tax return, A values the
gift at $100,000, but the Service could successfully argue that its true value is $150,000.
Under A's erroneous view, she has $500,000 remaining in her unified credit amount.
Under the Service's correct view, she has only $450,000. If, in a later year, A makes a
gift of $500,000, she will owe gift taxes on $50,000, notwithstanding that the earlier gift
was returned at $100,000. See I.R.C. § 2504(c) (1994) (stating that the value reported on
the earlier return is binding on a later return filed after the statute of limitations has run
on the earlier return only if gift taxes actually were paid on the earlier return, and the
consumption of unified credit is not considered payment of taxes). A's mistake on the
earlier return not only affects her ability to make future tax-free gifts in excess of
$450,000, but also affects the ability of her estate to detennine her estate tax liability with
accuracy.
93
See I.R.C. § 2504(c) (1994). Again, an example may clarify this point. Under
the previous footnote, A inaccurately valued a gift at $100,000, whereas the true value
was $150,000. Suppose A dies twenty years later without having made any gifts in the
interim, and her taxable estate is worth $500,000. The Service could argue that A's estate
must pay tax on $50,000. That is , no statute of limitations binds the Service to A's
estimate that her earlier gift was worth only $100,000.
94
See I.R.C. § 2703 (1994) (stating that the value of property is determined without
regard to agreements concerning price or restrictions on the right to sell).
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tary transfers. Thus, donors have an incentive to transfer wealth pursuant
to a series of small lifetime gifts rather than pursuant to a single testamentary transfer. The income tax, however, prefers testamentary transfers by
increasing the basis only in testamentary transfers. Finally, the Code
includes several provisions that reduce some of the hardships of the estate
and gift tax on closely held businesses, although none of the provisions
affords significant relief. Furthermore, although these provisions reduce
some of the costs associated with the death of a closely held business owner,
they fail to address in a satisfactory manner the appropriate taxation of the
closely held business interest itself. The interest should be taxed in the first
place only if doing so furthers the legitimate goals of the transfer tax
system.

III.

ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION GOALS

The goals of federal transfer taxation are central to this Article.
These goals determine the proper transfer taxation of interests in closely
held businesses. Commentators have proposed the following goals:
generating revenue, supplementing the income tax, and promoting
egalitarian principles. This Article does not dispute the importance of these
goals; rather, it demonstrates that neither the present transfer tax system nor
any realistic alternative to it accomplishes these goals. This Article,
however, develops an additional goal-the transfer tax system should
minimize the harmful effects of gratuitous transfers upon donees' work
efforts.

A.

Generating Revenue

The estate and gift tax does not produce significant revenues for the
federal government. 95 The amount the government collects from this tax is

95

See BITI'KER & CLARK, supra note 16, at 1; Donaldson, supra note 4, at 543;
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 300-04; Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to
Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269-70 (1983}; cf Ascher, supra note 15, at 72-73 (describing
the underutilization by the government of estate and gift taxation to produce revenue).
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a relatively small percentage of its total revenues. 96 Although the government raised $11.5 billion from this tax in 1990, this amount represented
only 1.12% of its total revenue and only 0.213% of the gross domestic
product.en
This sum is even more insignificant in light of the governmental costs
of administering the tax. Professor John E. Donaldson observes that the tax
"requires an inordinate amount of attention at the highest levels of government, especially in relation to the relative insignificance of the revenues
generated. "98 Moreover, tax planning and litigation are costly to taxpayers
and occupy the talents and energy of a substantial portion of the bar and
other professions.99
In summary, the tax generates small amounts of revenue, and its
administration is expensive to the government and taxpayers. Thus, the
goal of revenue generation provides no substantial basis for the existence of
the transfer tax system and yields no background against which to analyze
the transfer taxation of closely held businesses. 100

B.

Supplementing the Income Tax

The estate and gift tax conceivably supplements the income tax in two
ways. First, the estate and gift tax might heighten the progressivity of the
income tax rates. Second, the estate and gift tax might remedy certain
failures of the income tax system. It is questionable, however, whether the
estate and gift tax achieves these goals as effectively as might other
measures.

96

See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 301 (stating that "the actual yield ofthe[se] taxes
is low").
97
See id. at 301 & n.69 (citing Office of Management & Budget, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1992: Historical Tables, tbls. 1.1, 1.3, 2.S
{199~).

Donaldson, supra note 4, at 548 (footnote omitted}.
See id. at 549-50; McCaffery, supra note 4, at 302.
100
Cj. JOHN RAWlS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971) (endorsing transfer taxation
"not to raise revenue").
99
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Commentators have asserted that the estate and gift tax operate to
buttress the progressive rates of the income tax. 101 Professor Michael J.
Graetz believes that progressive income tax rates may be self-defeating and
that the estate and gift tax is necessary to save progressivity. 102 This
observation is true, he finds, because of the following effects. First, higher
marginal income tax rates discourage the productivity of affected
taxpayers. 103 Second, high rates encourage affected taxpayers to engage in
more legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. 104 Hence, the argument
goes, the estate and gift tax is necessary to preserve progressivity.
Professor Donaldson, although not disputing the above arguments,
questions them as being dated. Professor Graetz wrote his article, To
Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, in 1983. In the article, he called for
the reinvigoration of the estate and gift tax following its modification in
1981 105 to restore progressivity to the entire system of taxation. 106 Professor
Donaldson, however, observes that the United States Congress has ignored
Professor Graetz's call. Professor Donaldson writes,
[A]bsent a congressional resolve to reverse the direction of the
1981 legislation and to expand the scope of transfer taxes by
. . . increasing the effective progressivity of the transfer tax
rate structure, the existing estate and gift tax system has no
meaningful role as a contributor to progressivity. The prospect
of such changes is remote and even proponents of the progressivity role of transfer taxation are pessimistic that restoration of such a role is politically possible. 107

101

See Donaldson, supra note 4, at 543 (citing Graetz, supra note 95, at 271;
Gutman, supra note 79, at 1185).
102
See Graetz, supra note 95, at 272.
103
See id. at 273.
104
See id. Professor Graetz also points to certain "preference provisions," such as
lower rates on capital gains , which diminish progressivity.
105
Cf Donaldson, supra note 4, at 544 (citing Alicia H. Munnell, Wea/Jh Transfer
Taxalion: TheRe/alive Role for Eslale and Income Taxes, NEW ENG. EcoN. REV.,
Dec. 1988, at 6) (describing how the percentage of taxpayers affected by the estate and
gift tax has dropped to 1% following 1981 legislation).
106
Graetz, supra note 95, at 284.
107
Donaldson, supra note 4, at 544 (footnote omitted).
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Progressivity in taxation may be a worthwhile goal. 108 Congress, however,
is either unwilling to use the estate and gift tax for its promotion, or it has
determined that the tax is an ineffective means toward the goal.
The estate and gift tax may supplement the income tax in yet another
way. Professor Paul B. Stephan notes that "[o]ne of the principal justifications for a separate tax on the transfer of wealth is that it plugs gaps in the
income tax base. " 109 The largest gap to which Professor Stephan refers is
that "the income tax fails to include substantial portions of capital appreciation" 110 in assets that are not sold before their transfer during life or at
death. 111 Under his argument, appreciation enriches the holders of the
assets, but they pay no tax on this amount. The absence of a sale or
exchange suspends the appreciation in the assets. According to Professor
Stephan, the estate and gift tax limits the magnitude of this failure to tax
capital appreciation by taxing gratuitous transfers, thereby preventing
donors from completely escaping taxation when they transfer property with
built in gain. 112 Professor Stephan finds further support for this role of the
estate and gift tax by analyzing the different transfer tax treatments of gifts
and transfers at death. The estate tax has a higher effective rate than does

108

CJ Graetz, supra note 95, at 274-78; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 passim (1952) (defending
the goal of progressivity in taxation).
1CJ9Paul B. Stephan III, A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform, 72 VA. L. REV. 1471,
1472 p986).
1 0
Jd. at 1481.
111
The Code generally taxes this appreciation upon the sale of the asset. See I.R.C.
§ 100l(a) (1994). Bur cj I.R.C. § 1256 (1994) (taxing the increased appreciation of
certain investment contracts on a year-to-year basis).
112 D'fti .
. 1 rates among ~aamt'1y members may create an mcenhve
.
. aor
~
1 enng margma
donors to make gifts with appreciated property. What if a donor had two pieces of
property of equal value, but only one piece has appreciated? If the donor wanted to
transfer one as a gift, and if the asset were likely to be sold in the near future, she would
be inclined to choose the appreciated piece, because its appreciation would escape
taxation in her hands. In most cases the donee, who is a family member, will be in a
lower marginal income tax bracket than the donor, which means that a later disposition
of the property will likely produce a lower overall income tax burden for the family as a
group. A contrary incentive, however, is produced by the step-up in basis at death. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text. If the property is likely to be sold over the long
term, but not in the near term, the donor has an incentive to hold the appreciated property
until death, thereby permitting the donee to obtain a new fair market value basis in the
property.
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the gift tax. 113 Moreover, recipients of testamentary property· take a
stepped-up basis in the property, whereas recipients of inter vivos gifts do
not. 114 To summarize, Professor Stephan observes that the income tax fails
to tax capital appreciation when transferred either at death or in life. The
estate and gift tax responds by separately taxing these transfers. In addition,
the income tax prefers transfers at death over gifts by giving only the
former an increased basis upon transfer. Again, the estate and gift tax
responds by taxing transfers at death at a higher rate than gifts. 115
Professor Stephan's pragmatic justification for the estate and gift tax
reveals gaps in the income tax, but is not a satisfying justification for
transfer taxation. His justification is illusory. Congress could directly solve
these gaps, thereby rendering the estate and gift tax superfluous by Professor Stephan's theory. Indeed, the gaps are probably solvable, through
one of two alternative approaches.
First, by amending I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1015, 116 Congress could equalize
the different bases that gifts and testamentary transfers take under current
law. As noted earlier, 117 under I.R.C. § 1014, most property received from
a decedent receives a basis equal to the fair market value of the property at
the decedent's death. This provision has long been criticized as a major tax
loophole, 118 particularly in the absence of an estate tax burden at the
decedent's death, as in the case of an estate passing entirely to a surviving
spouse. 119 As observed by Professor Stephan, howe.•.'er, Congress in 1976,
instituted the carryover basis for testamentary transfers, but apparently
lacked the committnent for reform because it retroactively repealed the
change in 1980. 121>

113

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
115
.
See Stephan, supra note 109, at 1482.
116
See supra Part II. C. and accompanying text.
117
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
118
See Gutman, supra note 79, at 1192 & n.26 (citing various authorities to this
effect).
119
See id. at 1235-39 (proposing that I.R.C. § 1014 not apply to transfers qualifying
for the marital deduction).
121>
See Stephan, supra note 109, at 1485-86.
114

124

32 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

A second approach would be to treat death as an event that causes the
recognition of capital gains. This approach avoids a problem associated
with the 1976 carryover-basis legislation-the death tax basis adjustment.
With a carryover basis system, it is necessary to increase the basis of appreciated property by the death taxes attributable to the appreciation to make
the consequences of carryover basis consistent with the tax results of selling
appreciated property before death. 121 As explained by Professor Lawrence
Zelenak in a recent article on this subject, in the 1976 legislation the basis
adjustment was determined by multiplying the appreciation in each asset by
the average death tax rate for the estate. 122 Although this approach is simple
enough in concept, it creates significant practical difficulties because the
basis of every appreciated asset in the estate is uncertain as long as the value
of any of the assets is uncertain. 123 This problem is not encountered if death
is a realization event, because all assets would receive a fair market value
basis following the imposition of the tax. Moreover, carryover basis would
require the maintenance of basis records over multiple generations, while
realization at death would not. The realization-at-death approach also has
significant revenue advantages. 124
As Professor Zelenak observes,
·realization at death imposes the income tax at an ideal time in terms of
ability to pay; the decedent has no use for the funds, and whatever the heirs
receive is a windfall. 125
Taxing capital gains at death is also supported by sound tax policy.
As observed by Professor Joseph M. Dodge in a recent article responding
to Professor Zelenak's argument, imposing capital gains tax at death is supported by at least four different policies: the internal logic of the income
tax, economics, fairness, and distributive justice. 126 By internal logic,
Professor Dodge means that, under a sound system of income taxation, "the
same dollars should be neither taxed to, nor deducted by, a given taxpayer
121

See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361,368

(1993!2
1

See id.
See id. (observing that this problem exists because the average death tax rate for
the estate is a function of the value of every asset).
124
See id. at 370 (pointing out that the realization-at-death approach would produce
more than three times the additional revenue that would be produced by a carryover-basis
approach).
125
See id. at 367.
126
Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47
123

VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1838-42 (1994).
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more than once. " 127 In no respect is the taxation of gains at death inconsistent with this principle. By economics, Professor Dodge is referring to the
concept of economic neutrality-that a sound system of income taxation
should minimize its impact on investment decisions. 128 As Professor Dodge
observes, death is an ideal time to impose a tax on capital gains because the
tax would affect economic choices only minimally. 129 As to tax fairness,
Professor Dodge argues that taxing gains at death is consistent with the
principle that taxpayers should contribute according to their ability to pay. 130
Regarding the concept of distributive justice, Professor Dodge makes the
point that sound tax policy should take into account the relative contributions
made to tax revenues by various classes of society. 131 A rule taxing gains at
death is consistent with this policy. Moreover, the tax cost is not borne by
the transferor, who is dead, but by the transferees for whom the amounts
received are, as Professor Dodge observes, "in the nature of a windfall. " 132
Assuming that inherited wealth is less worthy than earned wealth, taxing
gains at death furthers vertical equity at a lower tax cost. 133
In short, the gaps in the income tax base described by Professor
Stephan134 can be addressed directly either by instituting a carryover-basis
rule or by taxing gains at death. The use of the estate and gift tax as an
indirect backstop to these gaps is, therefore, both unnecessary and
unsatisfying as a policy matter.
To summarize, commentators have argued that the estate and gift tax
supplements the income tax by periodically taxing accumulated wealth and
by buttressing the progressive rates of the income tax. The estate and gift
tax does not substantially add to the progressivity of the income tax, nor
does it need to do so. Congress could easily change the income tax rates.
Arguably, the estate and gift tax may strengthen areas where the income tax

127

ld. at 1839.
See id. at 1840.
129
See id.; see also id. at 1836-37 (arguing that pennitting realized appreciation to
escare income taxation favors capital appreciation over other types of income).
130
See id. at 1840-41.
131
See Dodge, supra note 126, at 1841 (observing that this is accomplished, in part,
by the progressive rate structure, which produces so-called vertical equity).
132 Id.
133
See id.
134
See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
128
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is weak by taxing appreciated property when transferred. The necessity,
however, of the estate and gift tax as a response to problems in the income
tax is dubious. Congress should not indirectly and halfheartedly address
these problems under the estate and gift tax. This Subpart shows that the
estate and gift tax does little to accomplish income tax related goals;
supporting the income tax does not justify the estate and gift tax. As such,
the relationship between the income tax and the estate and gift tax does not
present a framework by which to analyze the estate and gift taxation of
closely held businesses.

C.

Reducing the Unfairness of Disparate Accumulations of Wealth

Perhaps the estate .and gift tax serves some political goal beyond the
production of revenue or the protection of the income tax base. The
American Bar Association states, "[t]he transfer taxes serve, among other
purposes, to limit the perpetuation of large private concentrations of wealth
135
• • • .''
Yet, why should concentrations of wealth be limited? A possible
answer lies in what Professor Edward J. McCaffery calls "the liberal
egalitarian case for wealth transfer taxation.'' 136
In a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, Professor McCaffery
provides an overview of philosophical arguments for limiting wealth
accumulation by imposing a wealth transfer tax. Professor McCaffery
observes that modern philosophers see the transmission of private wealth as
problematic. The transmission of private wealth interferes with the
"equality of starting points." 137 Hence, wealth transfers interfere with the
principle "that people of equal abilities and aptitudes 'should have the same

135

American Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructur-

ing, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX. LAW. 395, 396 (1988); see also
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 289 (noting that reducing private accumulations of wealth is
a purported goal for the estate and gift tax); Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and
Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 249 ("It is sometimes said
that a wealth transfer tax curbs undue accumulations of wealth.").
136
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 289 (lower case added).
137
/d. at 290 (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE
202-27 (1980)).
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prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that
is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born!" 138
Professor McCaffery criticizes this argument on practical and
philosophical grounds. First, he argues that the current estate and gift tax
"encourages frequent, large, inter vivos gifts, " 139 and that no stronger
alternative to this system is politically feasible. 140 Second, he believes that
a stronger alternative would encourage the wealthy to consume, rather than
transfer, their wealth, thereby substituting inequality of consumption for
inequality of wealth. 141 Moreover, an estate and gift tax runs counter to the
liberal ideal that wssession of earned wealth is just. People hold this wealth
as capital, which supports the material needs of society. Indeed, the estate
and gift tax encourages consumption, and thus the dissipation, of this
wealth. 142
Hence, egalitarian philosophical arguments do not satisfactor.Hy justify
the estate and gift tax. 143 The liberal ideal of equality of starting points
conflicts with the liberal ideals of saving and thrift, thereby leaving the
estate and gift tax in a philosophical limbo. This egalitarian justification
fails, providing no model in which to analyze the transfer taxation of
interests in closely held businesses.

D.

An Economic Justification of the Estate and Gift Tax

The estate and gift tax decreases gratuitously transferred wealth.
Perhaps by doing so the tax encourages the productive work effort of
potential recipients. More than one hundred years ago, Andrew Carnegie
wrote,

138

/d. at 292 (quoting Rawls, supra note 100, at 73).
.
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 294; cf supra note 41 and accompanymg text
(describing the $10,000 per donee annual exclusion from gift tax).
140
See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 294.
141
See id. at ·295.
142
See id. at 295-96.
143
Professor McCaffery advocates abolition of the income tax and the estate and gift
tax. In their place, he would institute a "progressive consumption-without-estate tax."
ld. at 296, 345-58.
139
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I have therefore endeavored to prove that at the root of the
desire to bequeath to children there lay the vanity of the
parents, rather than a wise regard for the good of the children.
That the parent who leaves his son enormous wealth generally
deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to
lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would,
seems to me capable of proof which cannot be gainsaid. It is
many years since I wrote in a rich lady's album, "I should as
soon leave to my son a curse as the almighty dollar." 144
This Article argues that reducing the heir's temptation to "lead a less useful
and less worthy life" 145 is a worthwhile goal of the estate and gift tax.

1.

Microeconomic Analysis of Inheritance and Recipients' Worlc
Efforts

The argument that inheritance reduces the incentive for recipients to
work productively has popular appeal beyond Carnegie's conjecture.
Lotteries are an appropriate analogy to inheritance and to large inter vivos
gifts. Both involve individuals who receive wealth by chance, that is, by
choosing the right numbers or having affluent relatives. Popular tales
abound of how individuals win a lottery, retiring from their jobs to lead a
life of relaxation, if not luxury. 146 The media also contain stories of how

144

Andrew Carnegie, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTil AND
OrnER 'nMELY ESSAYS, 43 , 49-50 (1933).
145 ld.
146
See, e.g., Shannon Tanganan, A $101.8M Ticket ro Retirement-Phoenix Couple
HillheJackpot, U.S.A. TODAY, March 7, 1995, at 3A (describing how one couple went
into retirement overnight after winning the lottery).
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recipients of large inheritances withdraw from productive activities 147 or
never engage in them at all because of large inheritances. 148
The idea that recipients of large inheritances withdraw from
productive work is intuitively appealing, and this intuition finds a theoretic
justification in microeconomic analysis. Individuals work, for the most
part, to buy goods and services from the larger economy. The worker
receives pay and uses it to buy these goods and services. Another tenet of
microeconomics is that more goods and services are better than fewer. 149
Under this analysis, workers would constantly work to maximize their
ability to purchase the desired goods and services.
This conclusion is, of course, absurd. The analysis is not flawed, but
it is incomplete. One specific economic good is leisure (or the absence of
work), and its value prevents individuals from constantly working. As one
text states, "[t]he decision to work is ultimately a decision about how to
spend time." 150 Presumably, workers want leisure just as they want the
goods and services previously discussed. Workers do not buy leisure in the
traditional sense, but "cquiring it is not without cost. Leisure has an
opportunity cost-an hour of leisure costs the worker an hour of pay. 151
The value an individual places on leisure, compared with the value
placed on other goods and services, determines the individual's work
effort. 152 An individual participates in work, or any other activity, at a level
147

By "productive" we mean work or activities that return wealth or the expectancy
of wealth as a direct result of the work or activity. Hence, philanthropic activities would
not come within our discussion, because society at large would receive the tangible return
(other than the philanthropist's personal satisfaction). We do not mean to say that
philanthropy is not productive, but that it is distinct from what most people would call
work.
148
See, e.g., Eric Morganthaler, Oh Lucky Man: His Life is a Cruise, Year in,
Year Out, WAILST.I., Dec. ·20, 1991 at Al (describing how one heir to a multimillion
dollar estate has never worked and spends much of his time taking cruises).
149
See EDWIN MANSAEID, MICROECONOMICS 50 (1991) (assuming "the consumer
alwa~s prefers more of a commodity than less").
SO ROBERT G. EHRENBERG & ROBERTS. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 179
(1991).
151
See id. at 180 (assuming that "leisure's opportunity cost is the wage rate")
(emphasis deleted).
152
See id. at 153-54. Economists analyze the work decision by dividing goods into
two categories: leisure and money income.
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such that the marginal utility of the gain from the activity equals its marginal
cost. 153 This is a central holding of modern microeconomics. 154 The
marginal gain from a unit of work is the accompanying increase in wealth
that allows the worker to purchase extra goods and services. The marginal
cost is the foregone leisure that the worker would have enjoyed without the
extra work effort. Hence, the worker balances the value of work (i.e. , the
wealth that it produces) and the value of leisure in determining his or her
individualleyel of work. 155
How does increased wealth affect this balance? Economic theory
supports the notion that increased wealth causes people to work less.
Typically, economists expect that increases in wealth or income cause
people to consume more of the goods they want. These goods are normal
goods. 156 Conversely, consumers consume less of other goods when wealth
increases. These goods are inferior goods. 157
Economists consider inferior goods to be atypical. Examples of
inferior goods usually include inexpensive substitutes for other goods. 158
Leisure hardly fits within this description because it has few, if any,
substitutes. Economists typically assume that leisure is a normal good, 159
153

Economists analyze this situation by looking at consumers' budget constraints and
their preferences for combinations of goods. See id. at 156-59. The budget constraint
represents the worker's ability to consume leisure versus other goods. The preferences
represent the worker's willingness to substitute one good for another (e.g., the value of
an extra unit of leisure versus the value inherent in an extra hour of wages) . At the
optimal work level for the consumer, the ability to exchange leisure for other goods
corresponds to the willingness to do so. A leading microeconomics text states:
The rate at which the consumer is willing to substitute good X for good Y
(holding satisfaction constant) must equal the rate at which he or she is able to
substitute good X for good Y. Otherwise it is always possible to find another
market basket that will inl.!rease the consumer's satisfaction.
MANSAELO, supra note 149, at 79.
154
Cf. EDWIN MANSAElD, MICROECONOMICS 50 (1991) ("This is a famous result-and a very useful one that should be understood fully.")
155
See supra note 153 (examining this balance of work and leisure time).
156
See MANSAELD, supra note 154, at 89.
157
See id.
158
Cf. EHRENBERG & SMml, supra note 150, at 179 (describing public transportation
as an inferior good); MANSAElD, supra note 154, at 90 (describing oleomargarine as an
inferior good).
159
See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian, The Carnegie Conjecture: Some
Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. EcoN. 413, 414 (1993).
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although the empirical evidence as to the normalcy of leisure has been
ambiguous. 1ro
If leisure is a normal good, then increases in wealth are accompanied
by decreases in work effort. That is, wealthier workers consume more
leisure by decreasing their work effort. Inheritance is a pure increase in
wealth that is not associated with any work effort. 161 Thus, economic theory
supports the notion that inheritance decreases the recipient's work effort.
To summarize, leisure is an economic good. Its cost is the foregone
wages that the worker did not earn while consuming leisure. Workers
determine their work effort by balancing their desire for more wealth with
their desire for more leisure. Inheritance affects this balance because it
gives the recipient the means to consume more leisure by working less.
Leisure is probably a normal good because people will consume more of it
given an increase in their wealth. Hence, under this microeconomic analysis, inheritance provides a disincentive to work.

1

ro See id. (citing John Pencavel, Labor Supply ofMen: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF
LABoR EcONOMICS 63-64 (1986)). Bur see infra Part III .D.2. (finding labor participation
to decline with large inheritance).
161
By •pure• we mean that inheritance does not result from higher wages. Thus, it
does not increase the marginal cost of leisure. A wage increase is an impure increase in
wealth from this viewpoint. A wage increase certainly makes the worker wealthier
if the worker continues with the same work effort. The wage increase also increases the
marginal cost of leisure, which is the hourly wage itself. This effect makes leisure more
expensive. If leisure is a normal good, an increase in the hourly wage pulls the worker
in two directions. First, the increased wealth draws the worker to consuming more
leisure. Second, the higher wage draws the worker to consuming less leisure because it
is now more expensive. Essentially, the increased wage gives the worker the means to
consume more leisure, but also makes it more expensive. See MANSFlELD, supra note
159, at 89-90.
Leisure, as an economic good, has an interesting feature in this context. Ordinarily,
when the price of a good (e.g., bread) goes up, the consumer is poorer because available
income will now buy less of the good. If that good is a normal good, then the consumer
will necessarily consume less of it; the decreased wealth and the increased price relative
to other goods will convince the consumer to consume less of it. In contrast, the price of
leisure is the wage rate. If the price of leisure (i.e., wages) increases, then the consumer
ofleisure becomes wealthier. Thus, if leisure is a normal good, it is ambiguous whether
the consumer chooses to work more or less after a wage increase.

32 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

132

2.

Empirical Evidence of the Effect of Inheritance on Worlc Efforts

In a recent article, 1he Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical
Evidence, 162 three researchers set out to learn whether inheritance affects
labor market participation. Labor participation is a binary decision. Under
the researchers' model, an individual participated in the labor market if the
individual had any earnings from wages, salary, or a sole proprietorship. 163
Participation is distinct from supply. Whereas labor participation is a yesno decision, supply reflects the number of hours worked. Supply is difficult
to measure because of the lack of statistics for hours worked. 164
The researchers analyzed estate tax returns of decedents who died in
1982. The decedents' estates filed the returns in 1982 or 1983. The
researchers matched these estate tax returns with the 1982 and 1985 income
tax returns of the beneficiaries. 165 The estate tax returns identified the
amount of individual inheritances and the beneficiaries. The income tax
returns provided information on the recipients' work efforts before and after
receiving their inheritances. Specifically, the researchers considered a
recipient of an inheritance to be a participant in the labor market if the
participant had any wage, salary, or sole proprietorship earnings. 166
The researchers also obtained information on the labor participation
of joint filers. At the time of the study, the Code and the relevant income
tax return contained information allowing the researchers to determine
whether Qne, both, or neither of the spouses participated in the labor
market. 167

162

Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159.
See id. at 416.
164
See id. at 417.
165
See id. at 416.
166
See id. at 417.
167
See Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159. The specific infonnation relates to
a deduction based upon the earnings of the lower-earning spouse. The deduction was a
percentage of these earnings. Hence, if the joint return reported no active income, then
neither spouse participated in the labor market. If the joint return reported active income,
but no special deduction, then only one spouse participated in the labor market. Finally,
if the joint return reported active income and the special deduction, then both spouses
participated in the labor market. The researchers obtained this infonnation for both 1982
and 1985.
163
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The researchers used the income tax returns to examine the effect of
the individuals' inheritances upon their respective transitions into and out of
the labor force between 1982 and 1985. 168 Thus, the researchers could
compare the beneficiaries' labor force participation with the size of their
inheritances.
The researchers used the tax data to construct tables showing
transitions into and out of the labor market. Using these tables, the
researchers first observed the effects of inheritances on single filers. They
concluded that Andrew Carnegie was in fact correct: 169 "higher inheritances
are associated with a greater propensity to exit the market. "170 The most
dramatic results occurred with inheritances of more than $150,000. Of
individuals filing a single return with such inheritances, approximately 18%
of those already in the labor market left it within three years of receiving the
inheritance. 171 The researchers also noted that inheritance deters reentry to
the labor market. 172 For example, of those not in the labor market in 1982,
only 16% of those who inherited more than $150,000 had entered by
1985. 173
The researchers also constructed tables demonstrating the effects of
inheritances on joint tilers. These results were even more dramatic than
those for single filers, and the most meaningful transition was from two
earners to one earner. If both husband and wife were in the labor market
before receiving an inheritance of over $150,000, approximately 34% of the
time one or both of them left it within three years. 174
The researchers tested these results by using multi-variate analysis
that isolated the effect of increasing age on leaving the work force. They
found that the effect of inheritance was still significant. 175
168

See id. at 415 .
See id. at 420.
170
See id.
171
See id. at 418.
m See id. at 422 (noting that not all of these results were statistically significant).
173
See id. at 420.
174
See id. at 420..21. Of those cases where joint-tilers received inheritances over
$150,000, both spouses worked in 259 instances in 1982. In 1985, both spouses left the
work place 7 times (2.7%) and one spouse left 80 times (30.9%). This leads to a total of
33.59% when at least one spouse left (derived by (80+7)/259=0.3359).
17
s See id. at 424-26.
169
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In a more recent article, two researchers investigated the relationship
between inheritance and labor supply. 176 Labor supply and participation, as
stated before, are distinct. Workers may work fewer hours or at an easier
job for less pay. If so, they reduce their labor supply, but still participate in
the labor force. These researchers found that ''the labor disincentive of
inheritance is fairly small. " 177 For the largest estates, however, the
researchers excluded from consideration those who left the labor force after
receiving the inheritance. 178 Hence, the researchers of labor supply ignored
the very subjects whom the earlier researchers found most interesting:
those who left the labor market. 179 This approach may seem curious
because it excludes the biggest changes from the study. The value of this
approach, however, lies in its ability to explain workers' reactions to
inheritance at the margin. The'earlier research provided clear support that
inheritance lures people out of the labor market. The later research
provides equally clear support that those who resist the lure, by and large,
resist it completely. Hence, the articles provide a general observation:
recipients of a large inheritance are less likely to work at all. If beneficiaries do work, however, their work habits are not substantially different from
before. 180

Empirical evidence not only establishes that Andrew Carnegie was
correct about the effect of inheritances on donees, but also supports an
economic justification for the estate and gift tax. By imposing a tax on

176

David Joulfaian & Mark 0. Wilhelm, Inheritance and Labor Supply, 29 J. HUM.
REsOURCES 1205 (1994). David Joulfaian was also one of the three writers of The Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence. See Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159.
17
See Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 176, at 1207; see also Holtz-Eakin &
Joulfaian, supra note 159, at 430-32 (finding that effect on supply is less pronounced
when keeping participation constant).
178
See Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 176, at 1225 ("However, when personyears with very large changes in earnings are excluded ... the estimate falls to [low
levels of disincentive].").
179
Cf id. at 1231 ("Indeed, excluding outliers in earnings changes in our models
necessarily removes the observations containing exits from the labor market.") (footnote
omitted).
180
This observation is analogous to even earlier research on the effect of wage rates
on primary and secondary earners in a family. This research found that the work effort
(i.e., labor supply) of the secondary worker varies directly with the wage rate; however,
the work effort of the primary earner is independent of the wage rate. See John
Pencavel, Labor Supply of Men: A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 204
(1986); MARK KlWNGSWOR1ll, LABOR SUPPLY 94 (1983).

SPRING 1997

The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation 135

gratuitous transfers, the estate and gift tax prevents beneficiaries of
gratuitously transferred property from failing to contribute their skills and
efforts economically. Moreover, the estate and gift tax encourages regular
lifetime donations of modest amounts rather than lump-sum inheritances.
In sum, empirical research establishes that the receipt of modest
inheritances affected labor-force participation less than larger ones. 181
Additional research establishes that, absent effects on participation,
inheritance minimally affects labor supply. 182 Thus, by reduc~ng large
estates and forcing donors to give smaller, regular amounts during life, the
estate and gift tax coerces donors to convert inheritances into a stream of
lifetime gifts that do not disrupt labor participation.

3.

A Work-Based Policy of the Estate and Gift Tax

Parts III.D.l and 2 of this Arpcle show that microeconomic theory
and empirical research associate inheritance with lower worker effort.
Moreover, the empirical research shows that the only statistically significant
effect of inheritance is that heirs receiving large inheritances are more likely
to leave the labor force. In contrast, when heirs continue to work their level
of participation (measured by annual ~arnings) remains constant. 183 Thus,
recipients of inherited wealth usually have a binary decision-making
process. They will either leave work or stay. They will not, as a general
rule, significantly decrease their work effort if they stay.
Curiously, the estate and gift tax provides a relatively tailored remedy
to this phenomenon. 184 First, the current system taxes only relatively large
estates. 185 Second, the current system encourages wealthy individuals to
181

Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159, at 418. For example, only 4.57% of
single return filers who received inheritances of less than $25,000 left the labor market
within three years. Perhaps similar results would hold for recipients of planned giving
who receive $10,000 in annual gifts from a parent or $20,000 a year from both parents
together. However, these researchers did not study the effects of gifts on labor force
partic~ation .
1

See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
See supra Part 111.0.2.
184
We do not argue (or believe) that Congress ever considered this effect of the
estate and gift tax.
·
185
See supra note 4 (discussing the wealthiest taxpayers who pay the tax).
183
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transfer their wealth in an inter vivos stream of smaller gifts, rather than by
a lump-sum at death. 186

These two results diminish the harmful effects of gratuitous wealth on
work effort. First, by reducing the largest estates, the system diminishes
the likelihood that heirs will quit work; larger inheritances influence
recipients more than smaller inheritances. Second, by converting large
estates into a stream of lifetime gifts, the transfer of wealth is less likely to
disrupt work effort. If the wealth is not enough to cause the recipient to
leave the work force, its effect is not significant. Therefore, the estate and
gift tax is a suitable response to the problem of heirs leaving the work force.
Public policy, through the estate and gift tax, should, as a normative
matter, address the work efforts of heirs. Economically, attrition by heirs
imposes real economic costs on society that may frustrate macroeconomic
policy. Philosophically, encouraging the recipients of wealth to work
ameliorates the injustice of unequal wealth.
Individuals are prone to leave the work force when they inherit
wealth. This phenomenon indicates that heirs do not foresee or rely upon
1heir inheritance. If they did, they probably would have never worked at all
or engaged in lower levels of work that they would continue after inheriting
wealth. 187 Hence, future heirs may systematically fail to estimate the size or
timing of their inheritance.
..
This failure may cause future heirs to overinvest in human capital. If
they knew they would leave the workforce, then their investments in human
capital would decrease accordingly (as would their employers'). Investments in human capital are costly to the worker and society. 188
When heirs leave the work force, their employers must find replacements. If the heirs were highly skilled, the search is even more extensive

186

See supra Part III.D.2.
This observation is a corollary to the life-cycle model of labor supply. The lifecycle model implies that people work the most during the stages in their lives when they
are most productive. Early in life, they spend their time investing in human capital. In
the middle they work. In the end, they stop working for various reasons. See generally
Ehrenberg & Smith, supra note 150, at 242-53.
188
See id. at 301 (describing the costs of investments in human capital).
187
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and costly. These activities cause real social costs. 189
beneficiaries to work reduces these costs.
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Encouraging

Full economic productivity and full employment are important
macroeconomic goals. Workers leaving the work force endanger these
goals. By encouraging work force participation from heirs, the estate and
gift tax augments the macroeconomic goals of full productivity and full
employment.
Previously, this Article discussed the failure of the estate and gift tax
to achieve egalitarian justice. 190 Specifically, the current system does not
decrease inherited wealth to achieve true equality in starting points for
members of society. Furthermore, any stronger alternative may endanger
capital production or encourage ostentatious consumption by the producers
of wealth.
Although the current system may not substantially decrease wealth, it
may have an effect on the work efforts of recipients. By enco-uraging heirs
to work, the current system makes inequality more palatable. 191 The inequity remains because the rich stay rich. However, the inequity is not so
large because the rich stay in the work force.
Indeed, work may be virtuous in itself. Andrew Carnegie described
inheritance as a curse because the heir might never have the chance to find
her own way. 192 Presumably, Carnegie meant that the heir did not know
any better than to leave the work force, where one finds the moral value of
productive work. The estate and gift tax may act in a paternalistic manner
to save the heirs from themselves so that they find virtue in work.
In summary, the estate and gift tax plays a rational role in encouraging work by recipients of gratuitous wealth. 193 Indeed, aspects of the estate
and gift tax are seemingly tailored to this task. Furthermore, encouraging

189

EHRENBERG & SMI1ll,

supra note 150 at 166 ("firms incur significant costs in

hirin,~mployees ").
191

See supra Part III. C.

Cf. RAWLS, supra note 100, at 73 (distinguishing between a

and an indulgent aristocracy) .
192
Carnegie, supra note 144, at 50.
193
See supra Part 111.0.3.

frugal capitalist class
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work effort by heirs is a sensible policy. Economically, attrition from work
creates social costs and disrupts macroeconomic policy. Philosophically,
encouraging work decreases the inequity of disparate wealth and leads heirs
into finding the virtue of productiye work.

4.

Summary

Andrew Carnegie's intuition and modern economic research point to
one achievable goal for transfer taxation-encouraging recipients of donated
wealth to engage in productive work. The empirical research establishes
that recipients of large inheritances are much more likely to exit the labor
force than are other workers. Yet, those who do stay in the labor force are
not particularly prone to decrease their supply of labor. Hence, only
relatively large inheritances affect labor supply by prompting some workers
to exit. The federal estate and gift tax remedies this problem in two ways.
First, it decreases large inheritances by taxing them-{fecreased inheritances
create less disruption in the labor market. Second, it coerces donors to
transfer their wealth in smaller, lifetime gifts rather than by larger
inheritances. Smaller gifts do not disrupt the labor market as do larger
inheritances. Government has a proper role in encouraging heirs to work.
Doing so reduces social costs and promotes social justice. This justification
is the model that the next section of this Article uses to explore the proper
transfer taxation of interests in closely held businesses.

IV. CWSELY HELD BUSINESSES UNDER THE EsTATE
AND GIFT TAX
Part II of this Article reviewed the estate and gift tax provisions and
the specifics of their application to closely held businesses. Part III justified
and explained this regime by examining the effects of inheritance on labor
participation. This Part examines the gratuitous transfer of closely held
businesses under that justification. The argument that the estate and gift tax
encourages productive work by donees does not apply in one context. If the
taxed transfer is of a business in which the donee will participate, the estate
and gift taxes do not further this goal. In this situation, the donee is already
engaged in productive work and does not need the Code for persuasion into

SPRING 1997

The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation 139

productivity. Thus, Congress should reconsider the taxation of the transfer
of interests in closely held businesses.
Interests in closely held businesses are analytically distinct from other
property. The recipient of securities, real estate, and cash may not work to
maintain the assets. Most income from these assets is passive income. The
holder of a large interest in a closely held business may, however,
undertake actively to manage or participate in the business. Thus, these
interests are inherently distinct from other forms of donated wealth.
Part III. D described how beneficiaries of inheritances may decrease
their labor force participation. The estate and gift tax ameliorates this
problem by taxing larger estates. It also provides an incentive for donors to
make lifetime gifts of property rather than giving all of their property in a
lump sum at death. Nevertheless, this policy may not be relevant when the
recipient of an interest in a closely held business intends to participate
actively in its management. Here, the recipient already intends to meet the
policy without encouragement by the Code.
Beyond consumption, another reason for accumulating wealth exists.
Many individuals enjoy giving some of their wealth to the natural objects of
their bounty. The estate and gift tax, of course, curtails these gratuitous
transfers. Hence, the tax is effectively a tax on capital because it reduces
the attractiveness of capital to individuals. 194
Presumably, individuals work to gain wealth. Wealth, of course,
allows individuals to consume goods and services. But, people also produce
wealth to pass to their children and other beneficiaries. 195 The ability to

194

See Richard Wagner, INSmurE FOR REsEARCH ON THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION,
in FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION: A SlUDY IN SOCIAL COST, at 17-19 (1993) (arguing
that, empirically, the federal estate tax has, and will continue to, depress the capital
supplrtof the United States).
That is, people want wealth not only for direct consumption, but also for donative
purposes. Commentators continue to debate why people like giving away their wealth.
The altruistic camp argues that giving away wealth confers direct enjoyment upon the
donor. The services camp believes that people use gifts to family for control; that is, they
extract services from family members (such as attentiveness and visits) in exchange for
gifts and the promise of a pay-off at death. See B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic
Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON . 1045 (1983).
Of course, it is possible that people obtain wealth for wealth's sake and give it to

140

32 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

consume and give away wealth makes greater wealth desirable. The estate
and gift tax reduce the ability of individuals to enjoy their wealth fully
because it limits gratuitous transfers. 196 The two effects of this limitation
are fairly obvious. First, people will work less because the reward (wealth)
is cheapened by the estate and gift tax. 197 Second, people will consume
more and save less because the latter use is relatively more expensive than
the former. 198 Both of these effects diminish society's supply of capital.
The first retards its original formation, while the second accelerates its dissipation. Thus, the estate and gift tax harmfully affects productive capital
accumulations.
Previously, this Article found justification for the estate and gift tax
in its effect on recipients of wealth. 199 The estate and gift tax encourages
productive work from potential recipients of inherited wealth in two ways.
First, it discourages gratuitous transfers in general. Second, it encourages
donors to structure their transfers into a stream of small, inter vivos gifts,
which is less disruptive on labor supply than large, lump-sum inheritances.
We assume, for the sake of argument, that the benefits of the estate
and gift tax outweigh the costs. Americans gain from the tax by its
encouragement of productive work by donees and to a lesser extent from its
revenues. Americans lose from the tax by its discouragement of capital
production. These are the stakes, and we assume that they favor retaining
the basics of the current system. Nonetheless, when applied to closely held

their children for want of a better use at death. See Ascher, supra note 15, at 100-01
(hypothesizing that people accumulate wealth for its own sake). A corollary to this theory
is that people do not have a strong desire to leave wealth to their children. Our expe-riences cause us to question this argument, but we admit that it is an empirical question
that we are not equipped to answer.
196
Transfer taxation certainly does not prevent the passage of wealth, but it does
coerce people into giving it away in awkward ways. Compare supra note 4 (arguing that
transfer taxes do not stop the passage of wealth) with supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (arguing that transfer taxes encourage people to give their wealth in a stream
of lifetime gifts, rather than all at death).
197
See Ascher, supra note 15, at 101-02.
198
See supra text accompanying notes 141-42 (arguing that the estate and gift tax
creates inequality of consumption).
199
See supra Part III .D.
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businesses, the tax has no benefits, but still has costs. Hence, the estate and
gift tax should have a different application to closely held businesses. 200
The application of the tax should be different when it does not
beneficially affect donees' work decisions. The primary benefit of estate
and gift taxation evaporates when it taxes the transfer of interests in closely
held businesses in which the recipients will participate. Estate and gift
taxation benefits society by encouraging productive work on the part of
recipients. If a recipient receives an interest in a closely held business and
intends to manage the business, then no benefit exists for taxing the transfer
of the business.
The estate and gift tax has potentially adverse economic effects; its
application to the transfer of interests in closely held businesses is not even
neutral. The estate and gift tax indirectly levies a tax on capital. Part of the
value of capital is the owner's ability to leave it to family and other loved
ones. This cost is present in the taxation of closely held businesses, even
though the benefits disappear.
The special estate and gift tax provisions already in the Code do not
properly address the problem of taxing the transfer of interests in closely
held businesses. an The special use valuation rule of I.R.C. § 2032A simply
allows certain recipients of interests in closely held businesses to escape
what would otherwise be the unfair taxation of their interests based on
highest and best use. When I.R.C. § 2032A applies, the business has a
reduced going concern value, though the underlying property may be
economically more valuable in another use. 202 I.R.C. § 6166 provides relief
from the illiquidity of closely held businesses when the recipients must pay
estate tax. I.R.C. § 303 allows the owner of a closely held corporation to
pay the estate tax attributable to the corporation with corporate assets
without recognizing ordinary income. 203 Thus, none of these provisions

200

We believe the question of whether the benefits outweigh the costs of the estate
and gift tax is an empirical one, and outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, our
analysis indicates that any benefits disappear in the context of closely held businesses.
201
Cf supra Part II.D. (describing the special estate tax provisions applicable to
close~ held businesses) .
See id.
203
See id.

142

32 REAL PROPERTY. PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

provides the appropriate dispensation to recipients of closely held businesses
from wealth transfer taxation.
Current transfer taxation of closely held businesses retains all of the
costs of the larger system, but none of the benefits. Moreover, the special
provisions in the Code related to closely held businesses do not solve this
dilemma because they do not address its central issue: interests in closely
held businesses are distinct from other wealth.
Congress should thus provide legislation that goes beyond the current
treattnent of interests in closely held businesses. 204 Of course, any revisions
of the Code should allow special treatment of closely held businesses only
where the recipients of the interests plan actively to manage the business. 20S
Moreover, special treatment should apply to transfers under the estate and
gift tax, whereas currently the special provisions for closely held businesses
apply only to the estate tax. 206 Preventing abuse by taxpayers may be difficult. 207 But, helping the transfer of closely held businesses and promoting
the growth of productive capital are worth the effort.
To summarize, Part III of this Article establishes that the estate and
gift tax beneficially discourages recipients of gratuitous wealth from
decreasing their work effort. This Part, however, applies the general
justification for the estate and gift tax to a specific issue-the proper transfer
taxation of interests in closely held businesses. This Part concludes that if

204 Cf. AMERICAN FAMILY TAX REUEF ACT, supra note 80 (exempting a portion of
qualified interests in closely held businesses from decedents' estates).
205
Cf. I.R.C. § 2032A (1994) (allowing a special use valuation for real estate that is
part of a fann or closely held business where the recipient materially participates in the
operation of the farm or business).
206
Cf. Letter from L. Henry Gissel, Jr., President, The American College ofTrust
and Estate Counsel, to Representative Bill Archer, Chair, Committee on Ways & Means,
United States House of Representatives (November 10, 1995), reprinted in 21 ACTEC
NOTES 261 (1995).
207
For example, an individual may own a closely held business and other wealth.
If the Code provides a lower rate or other preferential treatment to the transfer of the
closely held business, the individual will find it advantageous for the business to hold
some of the other wealth. Because the individual's estate probably could offer a plausible
business purpose for some such techniques (e.g., the individual arguably transferred
securities to the business to allow the business to meet cash flow needs), interests in
closely held businesses probably should not be completely exempt from transfer taxation.
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the recipients of interests in closely held businesses intend to actively
manage this business, then taxing the transfer of these interests does not
further the general goal of transfer taxation.

V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by providing an overview of the law of estate and
gift taxation and then established a workable, economic theory for its
imposition. The estate and gift tax is necessary to give donees the proper
incentives to work. This policy is not valid, however, if the transferred
wealth is an interest in a closely held business in which the donee will
actively participate. In this situation, the estate and gift tax is detrimental.
It interferes with the transferor's decision to accumulate or consume this
wealth without the offsetting benefit of encouraging the donee to work.
Thus, Congress should reconsider applying the estate and gift tax to closely
held businesses.

